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In the latest blow to a cause of action seemingly hanging on by 
a thread, the Supreme Court in Hernandez v. Mesa continued to 
weaken the role of constitutional torts as an effective remedy to, or 
deterrent against, federal government misconduct.  In Hernandez, 
the Court dismissed a claim against a border patrol agent who shot 
and killed a fleeing unarmed teenager.1  Fifteen-year-old Sergio 
Hernandez Guereca (Guereca) was playing a game with friends in 
a dry culvert that runs through the border of the United States and 
Mexico; the game involved running back and forth between the two 
borders.2  While on the U.S. side of the border, a border patrol agent 
detained one of Guereca’s friends.3  Guereca then ran back to the 
Mexican side of the border and a border patrol agent shot him twice, 
* Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law.  Shannon Griffin, Roger
Williams University School of Law Class of 2022, generously provided research
assistance.
1. See Hernandez v. Mesa,140 S. Ct. 735, 739–40 (2020).
2. Id. at 740.
3. Id.
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killing him.4  Guereca’s parents brought a civil claim for damages 
against the agent who shot their son.5  The plaintiffs sought the 
civil damages remedy established in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents.6   
However, the Court dismissed the Hernandez case, reasoning 
that the expansion of claims against federal agents under Bivens 
should be done cautiously and that expansion was not justified 
given that the allegations presented a factual and legal context 
different from previous successful Bivens actions.7  The new context 
that justified the dismissal of the Hernandez case was that the 
shooting occurred across the United States and Mexican border.8   
The border patrol agent was standing on the U.S. side of the border 
while the shooting victim was on the Mexican side.9  The Court 
found that even though Fourth Amendment Bivens claims had gone 
forward in the past, the fact that the incident happened between 
two borders presented a new context and that the special factors of 
international relations and national security required dismissal.10  
Expressing skepticism about the legitimacy of a court-created 
remedy such as Bivens, the Court unsurprisingly dismissed the 
claim.11  The lawsuit created significant controversy and generated 
criticism, with some arguing that the Hernandez family had been 
denied justice.12 
4. Id.  Defendant Mesa disagrees with plaintiff’s description of the
incident and claims that Guereca and his friends were involved in an 
attempted illegal border crossing and were throwing rocks at the defendant.  
Id. 
5. Id.
6. Id.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents created a civil cause of
action against federal officials for violations of constitutional rights.  403 U.S. 
388, 389 (1988).  
7. See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 739, 743–49.
8. See id. at 744–45.
9. Id. at 740.
10. See id. at 743–46.
11. See id. at 741.
12. See Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Who Will Watch the Agents Watching
the Border?, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/opinion/who-will-watch-the-agents-
watching-our-borders.html [https://perma.cc/67Q8-ECY7] ; Linda Greenhouse,
Opinion, Will the Supreme Court Stand Up for an Unarmed Mexican Teenager
Shot by a Border Agent?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/24/opinion/supreme-court-mexico-border-
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 The Hernandez decision comes at the end of a long story of 
the diminishing possibility of bringing a successful Bivens claim. 
The decision reflects the Court’s firmly established hostility to 
constitutional torts in general and Bivens claims in particular.13  
The expansion of the qualified immunity defense that provides 
broad protection for defendants has further narrowed the 
possibility for successful redress against governmental misconduct. 
While Bivens claims may still be an option in a narrow range of 
circumstances, the limited scope and effectiveness of the remedy 
has created pressure for reform.  One such change would be to 
eliminate individual liability for government agents completely 
and, instead, allow those harmed to bring actions directly against 
the United States.  This model is used for negligence and other 
tortious acts committed by federal employees.14  Along with the 
proposed shift to governmental rather than individual liability, 
have come efforts to eliminate the qualified immunity defense.15  
The increasingly protective doctrine of qualified immunity 
significantly reduces the possibility of obtaining a judgment for 
violation of a constitutional right by either a state or federal 
employee. 
  The Court’s commitment to the severe limitation, if not the 
elimination, of damages claims against federal officials leaves many 
plaintiffs harmed by federal misconduct without any remedy.  The 
creation of a mechanism to deter misconduct and to provide 
compensation to victims of federal misconduct is in the hands of the 
legislature.  In order to create change, Congress and state 
legislatures would need to pass statutes that would shift liability 
from individual to governmental and that would eliminate or 
reform qualified immunity.  Such statues have recently been 
patrol.html [https://perma.cc/8HG8-9GBJ]; Mary Harris, The Supreme Court 




13. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to
Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933 (2019). 
14. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
15. Qualified Immunity is a defense to constitutional tort claims that
protects the defendant from liability unless the constitutional right at issue 
was clearly established and the defendant would reasonably have known that 
his actions violated that right.  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–39 
(1987). 
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introduced in both state legislatures and Congress.16  Perhaps the 
opportunity for reform is at hand given the increasing public 
awareness and revulsion against the abuses, particularly against 
black and brown people, perpetrated by state and federal law 
enforcement.  The frustration following the Hernandez decision 
may well have added fuel to the reform movement.  
 In Part I, this Survey explains the origins and subsequent 
Court hostility to the Bivens remedy.  Part II analyzes the 
reasoning in the Hernandez decision.  Part III examines the use of 
Bivens in excessive force cases.  This Survey concludes in Part IV 
with a discussion of  reforms that might provide a meaningful civil 
remedy for federal government misconduct and suggests that 
shocking denials of remedy, such as in Hernandez, might bolster 
reform efforts.   
I. THE SHORT, SAD STORY OF THE BIVENS ACTION
A civil remedy for violations of constitutional rights by federal 
agents was first created only in 1971 by the Court in Bivens.17  
There, the plaintiff was allowed to bring a claim for money damages 
against agents for their actions during the execution of a 
warrantless search and the plaintiff’s subsequent detention.18  
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered and searched the 
plaintiff’s apartment, manacled the plaintiff in front of his wife and 
children, and held the plaintiff in custody.19  The Court rejected the 
defendants’ argument that the only remedy available to the 
plaintiff for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights should be 
under state tort law, finding that the constitutional remedy against 
16. See Jacob Gershman, Some States Are Pushing Laws to Restrict Police
Behavior, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 19, 2020 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-states-are-pushing-laws-to-restrict-police-
behavior-11597829401 [https://perma.cc/5DLM-XG59]; Jamie Ehrlich, 
Democrats team for effort to end doctrine shielding police as GOP backs off, 
CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/01/politics/qualified-immunity-senate-
markey-warren-sanders/index.html [https://perma.cc/3CAM-UV2N] (last 
updated July 1, 2020 9:50 PM). 
17. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 401 U.S. 388 (1971).  Prior to
Bivens, the only civil remedy available to victims of misconduct by federal 
agents was through state tort law.  
18. Id. at 389–90.
19. Id. at 389.
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federal agents was available regardless of any possible state law 
remedy.20 
In Bivens, the Court created a federal analog to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, enacted by Congress in 1874 to allow civil damages against
state officials for violations of civil rights.21  Section 1983 only
became a useful civil remedy in 1961 when the Court in Monroe v.
Pape expanded the scope of the remedy to cover unauthorized
constitutional violations by state agents.22  Prior to Monroe, the
§ 1983 statutory remedy was interpreted to cover only
unconstitutional actions that were authorized by state law, thus
limiting the remedy to the rare circumstance when a state explicitly
enacted or authorized unconstitutional behavior.23
Beginning with the court-created Bivens remedy; plaintiffs 
could bring claims against federal agents in a similar manner to 
those brought against state officials under § 1983.  However, the 
Bivens remedy imposed some limitations that were not present in 
the statutory remedy.  Constitutional claims would not be allowed 
against federal officials if there were “special factors counseling 
hesitation” or if an “equally effective alternative remed[y]” was 
available to the plaintiffs.24  
Following the Bivens decision, the Court expanded the scope of 
the remedy beyond the Fourth Amendment to the equal protection 
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.25  In 
Davis v. Passman, the Court concluded that a claim of gender 
discrimination by a congressional employee could be the basis of a 
20. Id. at 390–92.
21. See id. at 389.  Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage of any State of Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.   
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
22. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
23. See id.
24. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246, 248 (1979).
25. Id. at 248–49.
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civil cause of action under the Fifth Amendment.26  Just one year 
later, in Carlson v. Green, the Court again permitted a Bivens claim 
to go forward in a new context—the Eighth Amendment rights of a 
federal prisoner.27  The case involved allegations that the plaintiff 
received inadequate medical care while imprisoned and that this 
led to his death.28  Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff could 
bring a tort claim under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) for 
this injury, the Court determined that a Bivens claim was  an 
appropriate complementary action.29  Significantly, the Court in 
Carlson explained that even if the plaintiff had another remedy 
under FTCA, the remedy provided by Bivens was a “parallel, 
complementary cause[ ] of action.”30 
In these early years after the Bivens decision, in opinions 
authored by Justice Brennan, who also wrote the majority opinion 
in Bivens, the Court allowed a generous expansion of the claim.  In 
Davis, for example, “special factors counseling hesitation” were 
overcome even when there was a possible collision with the Speech 
or Debate Clauses.31  And, in Carlson, an alternative remedy was 
not considered a bar because that remedy was not as “equally 
effective” as a direct action based on the Eighth Amendment.32  In 
the following decades, however, the Court has consistently refused 
to expand the range of claims possible under Bivens.  Broadly 
construing the special factors that constitute a basis for rejecting a 
claim and finding weak alternative remedies, or in some situations 
no remedy, acceptable, the Court has strictly limited the scope of 
Bivens.  Since 1980, the Court has not met a Bivens claim it likes.  
Beginning with Chappell v. Wallace, the Court steadily 
restricted the application of Bivens.33  Similar to Davis, Chappell 
26. Id. at 230–31.  Even though the suit against a congressman raised
special constitutional concerns, the Court determined that the suit could go 
forward.  Id. at 246. 
27. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16–18 (1980).
28. Id. at 16 n.1.
29. See id. at 19–20.
30. Id. at 20.
31. Davis, 442 U.S. 228, 234, 235–36 n.11 (1979); see also U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 6, cl. 1 (establishing immunities for Congresspeople involved in legislative 
activities). 
32. See Carlson v Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980).
33. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
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involved claims of discrimination by Navy-enlisted men against 
their superior officers.34  The Court concluded that the military 
context of these claims constituted a “special factor counseling 
hesitation” and dismissed the claim.35  Finding itself to be “ill-
equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any 
particular intrusion upon military authority might have,” the Court 
determined that allowing military personnel to bring civil claims 
against their superior officers may well be disruptive to the military 
and so should not go forward.36  Similar special factors were found 
in United States v. Stanley where the claim brought against 
military officials by a serviceman who had participated in chemical 
warfare experiments was rejected because of the impact such suit 
might have on military discipline and decision making.37  
In Bush v. Lucas, the availability of an “equally effective 
alternative remedy” precluded a Bivens claim by a federal employee 
for violation of his First Amendment rights. 38  Unlike in Carlson, 
the existence of a remedy under the civil service procedures was not 
considered a complementary remedy, but rather created a bar to a 
Bivens action.39  Even though the remedy supplied by the Civil 
Service Commission procedures “was not as effective as an 
individual damages remedy,” the Court nonetheless determined 
that a claim under Bivens should not go forward.40  The Court 
concluded that given the development of extensive civil service 
procedures and protections for federal employees, the 
determination of whether a new civil damages remedy is 
appropriate should be left to Congress.41  Further, the Court has 
34. Id. at 297.
35. Id. at 304–05.
36. Id. at 305 (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 
37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 187 (1962)). 
37. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671, 682, 685–86 (1987).  In
denying the remedy the Court also relied on the “incident to service” doctrine, 
which disallows damages under the FTCA for injuries to soldiers received as a 
result of their military service.  See id. at 681. 
38. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 374–89 (1983).
39. See id.
40. Id. at 372.
41. Id. at 390.
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made clear that even in the absence of any alternative remedy, a 
Bivens claim might not succeed.42 
In declining to extend a Bivens remedy to a claim against a 
private halfway house for former federal inmates, the Court 
explained that since Carlson the Court has “consistently refused to 
extend Bivens liability in any new context or new category of 
defendants.”43  In Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko, 
extending liability to a corporate entity was considered “a new 
context.”44  Finding that the purpose of the Bivens remedy was to 
deter individual federal officials from engaging in unconstitutional 
action, an extension of the remedy to claims against a corporation 
would not be consistent with prior precedents.45  The refusal to 
expand Bivens to what can be construed as a “new context” 
continued in Ziglar v. Abbassi  where the Court explained that:   
If the case is different in a meaningful way from previous 
Bivens cases decided by this Court, then the context is new. 
Without endeavoring to create an exhaustive list of 
differences that are meaningful enough to make a given 
context a new one, some examples might prove instructive. 
A case might differ in a meaningful way because of the rank 
of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the 
generality or specificity of the official action; the extent of 
judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond to the 
problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or 
other legal mandate under which the officer was operating; 
the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the 
functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential 
42. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 541 (2007) (holding that, in a claim
against Bureau of Land Management for damages, a Bivens claims might be 
unjustified even if there is no other way to vindicate the right asserted by the 
plaintiff); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 69 (2001) (declining 
to extend Bivens to allow recovery against a private corporation operating a 
halfway house and “reject[ing] the claim that a Bivens remedy should be 
implied simply for want of any other means for challenging a constitutional 
deprivation in federal court.”). 
43. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 63, 68.
44. See id. at 74.
45. Id. at 74; see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1994)
(concluding that a Bivens action could only be brought against an individual). 
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special factors that previous Bivens cases did not 
consider.46 
In short, anything other than the same factual and legal context 
found in Bivens, Davis, or Carlson, would be rejected as a “new 
context.”  By the time of the Abbasi decision, it was clear that while 
Bivens might not yet be overruled it would be kept firmly within 
the contours of the claims recognized in the few successful opinions 
issued in the 1980s.47  
At the same time the scope of Bivens claims was being 
narrowed, the protections provided to defendants by qualified 
immunity were strengthened.  The qualified immunity defense 
protects officials from liability unless they are violating clearly 
established constitutional rights and would reasonably be aware of 
those rights.48  This defense has become increasingly protective. 
For example, in Wilson v. Layne, the Court determined that the 
decision to allow the media to accompany officers into a private 
home during the execution of an arrest warrant was a violation of 
46. 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1851, 1859–60, 1869 (2017) (no Bivens claim against
high-ranking officials in Justice Department for detention of illegal aliens). 
47. The Court created another barrier to successful Bivens claims in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2017).  The plaintiff, Iqbal, was detained by 
federal officers after 9/11 and alleged that his treatment while detained was 
based on his race and religion in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.  
Id. at 1942, 1944.  Among the defendants were the Attorney General and the 
Director of the FBI.  Id. at 1942.  The Court dismissed Iqbal’s claims against 
high-ranking officials for failure to state a claim.  Id. at 1943.  The Court found 
that the high-ranking officials’ involvement in the unconstitutional treatment 
was not supported by sufficient factual content and that the allegations were 
merely conclusory.  Id. at 1951, 1954.  This seeming tightening of Federal Rule 
of Procedure Eight’s requirements has been sharply criticized.  See, e.g., Gary 
S. Gildin, The Supreme Court’s Legislative Agenda to Free Government From
Accountability for Constitutional Deprivations, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1333,
1374-75 (2010); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and
Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 575–83 (2010); Goutam U.
Jois, Pearson, Iqbal, and Procedural Judicial Activism, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
901 (2010); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Who Will Supervise the Supervisors?
Establishing Liability for Failure to Train, Supervise or Discipline
Subordinates in a Post-Iqbal/Connick World, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273,
288–98 (2012); Alexander A. Reinert, Supervisory Liability and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 945, 977–78 (2020); Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, 
Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
157 (2010).
48. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987).
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the Fourth Amendment.49  However, the defendants were protected 
by qualified immunity because the violation of the Fourth 
Amendment had not been set down with sufficient specificity by an 
earlier court decision.50  While the general principle had been 
established—that third parties could not be brought into private 
homes when police were executing a warrant—its specific 
application to this situation had not been made prior to the time of 
the incident.51  
Another common theme in qualified immunity is whether the 
official’s action was reasonable under the circumstances.  This 
defense is often successful in cases alleging use of excessive force. 
In Scott v. Harris, the Court determined that it was reasonable 
under the circumstances for a police officer to use deadly force to 
stop a fleeing motorist, even though the motorist was being pursued 
only for speeding.52  The police officer used a technique designed to 
stop a speeding car by pushing the police car into the bumper of the 
car being pursued.53  This maneuver caused the motorist to lose 
control and crash.54  The accident resulted in severe injuries 
causing the plaintiff to be quadriplegic.55  The Court reasoned that 
the risk to the public caused by a speeding car pursued by police 
justified the use of deadly force.56  The use of a dangerous and 
possibly deadly technique was a reasonable response to the reckless 
driving of the fleeing motorist when the recklessness “threaten[ed] 
the lives of innocent bystanders.”57  Thus, even with the use of 
deadly force, a broad definition of reasonableness protects 
officials.58   
49. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 605–06 (1999).
50. Id. at 606.
51. See id. at 616–17.
52. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374–75, 386 (2007).
53. Id. at 375.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 386.
57. Id.
58. See id.; Plumhoff v. Richard, 572 U.S. 765, 768 (2014) (holding that
shooting at a fleeing vehicle even after vehicle was stopped was reasonable); 
Reich v. City of Elizabethtown, 945 F.3d 968, 974, 973, 977 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(holding that shooting a man holding a knife twenty to thirty feet away who 
had turned away to run was reasonable); Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 
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II. HERNANDEZ FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM REJECTED
It was against this background that the Court considered 
whether the Hernandezes could bring their Fourth Amendment 
Bivens claim.  Defendant Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr., shot 
the plaintiffs’ child, Sergio Hernandez Guereca.59  The shooting 
took place in an area between the United States and Mexico 
borders.60  The plaintiffs claimed that Agent Mesa violated their 
son’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.61    
In an opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court began 
by explaining that the judicially-created Bivens remedy was a 
product of an earlier era that has now been discredited.62  The 
Court has come to see the creation of implied causes of action, such 
as Bivens, as an inappropriate judicial incursion into the power of 
the legislative branch.63  It is a legislative, not judicial, prerogative 
to determine what type, if any, remedy is available for violations of 
law.64   In fact, the action of the Bivens Court in creating the remedy 
has come to be seen as incorrect: “if ‘the Court’s three Bivens cases 
[had] been . . . decided today,’ it is doubtful that we would have 
reached the same result.”65  Justice Alito concluded that given the 
now “disfavored” practice of creating judicial remedies without 
clear legislative intent, extension of Bivens must be approached 
with caution.66  That caution is manifested in a twostep inquiry: 
does the claim arise in a new context from previous Bivens cases; if 
944, 946 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that shooting a sixteen-year-old crawling 
away from an officer was reasonable); Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 
901, 904 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that shooting a fifteen-year-old boy with a 
knife from across the room was reasonable).  
59. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 740 (2020).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 741.  Justices Roberts, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined the
opinion of the Court; Justice Thomas separately concurred, joined by Justice 
Gorsuch; Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented.  Id. at 
735. 
63. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch argued that the time has come to
overrule Bivens.  Id. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
64. See id. at 741 (majority opinion); see also id. at 750 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). 
65. Id. at 742–43 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856–57
(2017)) (majority opinion). 
66. Id. at 742.
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so, are there special factors counseling hesitation in expansion of 
the remedy.67  The definition of a new context must be interpreted 
broadly and the special factors weighing against a Bivens claim 
should be based on a consideration of the necessity and efficacy of 
the remedy and a weighing of the costs and benefits.68   
Justice Thomas would have gone further and “abandon[ed] the 
[Bivens] doctrine altogether.”69  He argued that the Court has 
abandoned judicial creation of remedies, leaving the Bivens remedy 
a relic of a mistaken past.70  Noting that the Court has not extended 
the scope of Bivens for forty years, Justice Thomas concludes that 
the basis of the decision has been undermined and should no longer 
be followed.71  The role of creating a remedy for constitutional 
wrongs against federal agents should be left to the legislature.72  
Congress has shown its ability to create such a cause of action with 
the adoption of § 1983 and Congress is capable of doing the same 
for federal misconduct should it choose to do so.73 
Applying the flexible and broad standards laid out in his 
opinion, Justice Alito unsurprisingly found that the Hernandez case 
presented a new context.  The context was new even though 
Hernandez presented a similar constitutional claim to the original 
Bivens action—excessive force by a law enforcement official. 
Despite the long recognition of Fourth Amendment Bivens claims, 
the cross-border location of the incident at issue provided the 
meaningful difference between Hernandez and previous excessive 
force cases. 
Finding a new context, the Court went on to consider special 
factors and found that “there are multiple related factors that raise 
warning flags.”74  Those warning signs are the potential effect on 
foreign relations and national security, and the respect for the 
separation of powers inherent in those two areas.75  The area of 
67. Id. at 743.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 753 (Thomas, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 750–51.
71. See id. at 750–53.
72. See id. at 752.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 744 (majority opinion).
75. Id. at 744–46, 749.
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foreign relations is not the province of the courts—the authority of 
the executive branch must be respected.76  Because Hernandez 
involves the killing of a Mexican citizen in Mexico, the case 
necessarily becomes a matter of international concern.77  The way 
in which this matter should be resolved should be left to the 
executive branch.78  With respect to the Hernandez shooting, any 
differences between the United States and Mexico in what the 
consequences should be must be reconciled between the two 
governments without judicial interference.79   
National security is a similar concern, best left to political 
branches rather than to the courts.  Control of illegal cross-border 
activity is an issue central to national security and management of 
that activity is the purview of the executive branch through the 
Customs and Border Protection Agency.80  Comparing the facts in 
Hernandez to Chappell, the Court reasoned that just as the system 
of military discipline should not be interfered with, the regulation 
and discipline of agents who work at the border, such as defendant 
Mesa, should not be intruded upon by the creation of a Bivens 
remedy.81  Congress’s actions in limiting extra-territorial remedies 
in some situations and providing them in others provides another 
indication that remedies in this area should be left to the discretion 
of Congress and the Executive Branch.82  Undercutting the 
76. Id. at 749–50.
77. See id. at 744–45.
 78. See id.  The Justice Department investigated the incident and 
determined that Agent Mesa “did not act inconsistently with [Border Patrol] 
policy or training regarding the use of force.”  Id. at 744 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
79. Id. at 745.
80. See id. at 746.
81. Id. at 746–47 (citing United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987);
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983)). 
82. Id. at 747–49 (citing Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350; Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734; Federal Employees Liability
Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679).  See also Ivan E.
Bodensteiner, Congress Needs to Repair the Court’s Damage to § 1983, 16 TEX. 
J. C.L. & C.R. 29, 32–33 (2010)(arguing that the Supreme Court has rendered
constitutional rights “second class rights” because the Court has narrowed §
1983 actions by establishing both absolute and qualified immunity, almost
entirely excluding municipalities from respondeat superior liability, limiting
supervisory liability, imposing a plausibility pleading requirement, narrowing
the definition of “under the color of state law,” requiring clear evidence that
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reasoning of Bivens, Justice Alito asserted that even if there is no 
other remedy for the harm, a constitutional tort claim might still 
not be allowed to go forward.83  Justice Alito concludes by 
emphasizing that the application of a judicial remedy, such as 
Bivens, should not be available so as to respect the roles of the 
political branches and “[t]o avoid upsetting the delicate web of 
international relations.”84  Deciding what type of remedy or if any 
remedy should be available in is the responsibility of Congress and 
not the courts.85
 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg challenged the majority’s 
conclusion that the Hernandez case presented a “new context.”86  
The Hernandezes’ claim “arises in a setting kin to Bivens itself: 
Mesa, plaintiffs allege, acted in disregard of instructions governing 
his conduct and of Hernández’s constitutional rights.”87  The type 
of excessive force allegation against federal law enforcement 
officials had been recognized as a common basis for a Bivens 
claim.88  Since the purpose of Bivens is to deter unconstitutional 
behavior of federal officials and the agent shot from the U.S. side of 
the border, Ginsburg concluded that the fact that the victim was on 
the Mexican side should be of no consequence because the 
unconstitutional use of excessive force occurred in the United 
States.89  The dissent also disputes whether the Hernandezes’ 
claim presented special factors.90  Unlike in Abbasi, “no policies or 
policy makers [were] challenged in [the] case.”91  Ginsburg also 
questioned why the diplomatic issue is different if the shooting 
victim is killed on the Mexican side of the border rather than on the 
Congress intended to provide for the violated right, and limiting the 
availability of punitive damages).  
83. See Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 750.
84. Id. at 749.
85. Id. at 750.
86. Id. at 756 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 757.
90. Id.
91. Id.  The defendants in Ziglar v. Abbasi, were high ranking officials at
the Justice Department and wardens at federal detention facilities.  137 S.Ct. 
1843, 1851 (2017).  In contrast, the defendant in Hernandez is a border patrol 
officer. 
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U.S. side.92  Excessive force claims brought by Mexican citizens 
have gone forward under Bivens when they occur within the United 
States.93  Congress has been aware of these suits and not sought to 
prevent them.94  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent concludes by criticizing 
the Court’s reasoning, which allows for no remedy for border agent 
misconduct.95 
III. NOT SUCH A NEW CONTEXT
A Fourth Amendment Bivens action brought against a federal 
law enforcement official is anything but new.  In fact, Bivens itself 
involved a claim for unreasonable search and excessive force 
against federal agents.96  As the petitioners’ brief pointed out, this 
type of action is the most common type of Bivens action—claims 
against individual federal officers for misuse of their enforcement 
authority is the bread and butter of Bivens actions.97  As noted in 
the Hernandez dissent, the use of deadly force by border agents 
potentially resulting in Bivens actions is unfortunately common.98  
Several suits based on deadly shooting by border patrol officers 
have been brought—some resulting in settlements or dismissal 
based on qualified immunity.99  In one case, Dominguez v. Corbett, 
strikingly similar to Hernandez, a border patrol agent in Arizona 
shot a Mexican citizen as he was attempting a border crossing.100  
92. Id. at 757.
93. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Corbett, No. CV 08-648-TUC-DCB, 2011 WL
2882001 (D. Ariz. July 19, 2011). 
94. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 758 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 760.
96. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
97. See Brief for Petitioner at 22, Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020)
(No. 17-1678) (“The Fifth Circuit has previously explained that ‘[t]he classic 
Bivens-style tort’ is one ‘in which a federal law enforcement officer uses 
excessive force, contrary to the Constitution or agency guidelines.’” (quoting 
Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1293 (5th Cir. 1987))). 
98. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 760 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
99. See, e.g., Mendez v, Poitevent, 823 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2016); Dominquez
v. Corbett, No. CV 08-648-TUC-DCB, 2011 WL 2882001 (D. Ariz. July 19,
2011); Estate of Alvarado v. Tackett, No. 13-CV-1202 W (JMA), 2015 WL
13239185 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2015); Complaint, Vicente v. United States, No.
5:20-cv-00081, 2020 WL 2473881 (S.D. Tex. May 12, 2020).
100. First Amended Complaint at 10, Dominquez v. Corbett, No. CV 08-648-
TUC-DCB, 2011 WL 2882001 (D. Ariz. Nov. 24, 2009). 
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The border patrol agent approached several men in a car—
suspecting them of illegally crossing the border.101  As alleged in 
the plaintiff’s complaint, the men were ordered to kneel down and, 
as they were in the process of doing so, the agent shot one of them 
seemingly without provocation.102  As with Hernandez, the 
shooting victim’s parents brought a Bivens suit against the agent 
based on the Fourth Amendment.103  The district court in 
Dominguez allowed the Bivens claim to proceed and the case 
resulted in a settlement.104  The only difference between 
Dominguez and Hernandez was that the Dominguez shooting took 
place in Arizona, a few miles past the border.105  
In contexts other than border security, a wide range of Fourth 
Amendment claims have been successfully brought against federal 
law enforcement for various types of misconduct.106  Fourth 
Amendment claims are second only to prisoner treatment claims as 
the most common type of Bivens actions.107  These routine excessive 
force and unreasonable search actions are relatively successful and 
have resulted in judgements for the plaintiffs and numerous 
settlements.108  The new context determination found in Hernandez 
appears to be a stretch.  The factual and legal issues that would 
have been raised by the Hernandez case are well within the familiar 
competence of the federal courts.   
101. Id. at 9.
102. Id. at 9–10.
103. Dominguez, 2011 WL 2882001 at *1.
104. Id. at *5; Order Dismissing Dominguez v. Corbett, No. 4:08-cv-00648-
DCB-BPV (D. Ariz. Nov. 1, 2011) (Bloomberg Law). 
105. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 100, at 10.
106. See, e.g., DeMayo v. Nugent, 517 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2008) (warrantless
entry); Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2007) (unreasonable 
seizure); Dickey v. United States, 174 F. Supp.3d 366 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(unreasonable search); Terrell v. Petrie, 763 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D. Va. 1991) 
aff’d, 952 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1991) (unlawful search). 
107. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and
Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 836 
n.138 (2010).
108. See id. at 837.  Professor Reinert has found that during the three-year
period from 2001 to 2003 approximately thirty percent of the Bivens claims in 
the five judicial districts he surveyed resulted in successful outcomes for the 
plaintiffs.  Id. at 836 n.138. 
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IV. THE FUTURE OF RELIEF FOR FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL
MISCONDUCT 
Given the increasingly limited role of Bivens in providing relief 
and deterrence from federal agents’ misconduct, and the increasing 
strength of defendant protective immunities, the question arises of 
whether there will be any remedy for the misconduct.  The current 
climate for constitutional remedies against federal agents is bleak. 
Bivens is severely limited, the Federal Tort Claims Act does not 
cover actions based on constitutional law, and the Westfall Act does 
not allow state tort actions against federal employees.109  Against 
this background, pressure has been mounting for change. 
A. Governmental Rather Than Individual Liability
One avenue of relief may come from amendment to the Federal
Tort Claims Act.110  The FTCA is the statutory mechanism through 
which the United States can be sued for torts committed by federal 
employees acting within the scope of their employment.111  The 
government has waived its sovereign immunity and the suit 
proceeds against the United States, not the individual federal 
employee and any compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff 
are paid by the United States.112  This regime has been in place 
since 1946 and has been used to provide relief for the negligence 
109. The FTCA is of limited use in providing a remedy for law enforcement
misconduct due to the popularly named Westfall Act, Federal Employees 
Liability and Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679, which 
limits liability for law enforcement officials under the FTCA.  See John F. Preis, 
Alternative State Remedies in Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L. REV. 723, 745 
(2008); James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy 
and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 122–123 (2009); Alexander 
A. Reinert & Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Reframing Bivens
after Minneci, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1473, 1496–97 (2013).
110. See Paul David Stern, Tort Justice Reform, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
649, 656 (2019).  Professor Stern argues that because the Bivens remedy has 
proved to be so inadequate, the FTCA should be amended to provide a remedy 
for constitutional torts.  Id. 
111. See id. at 564.
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
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and other tortious conduct of government employees.113  The scope 
of the FTCA is limited to torts that are recognized by state law for 
which an individual might be held liable.114  Thus, actions for 
violations of constitutional rights are not cognizable under the 
FTCA.115  Some scholars have suggested that an amendment to the 
FTCA to provide a waiver of sovereign immunity for constitutional 
torts would provide a sound mechanism for deterrence and 
compensation for wrongful acts.116  As the United States would be 
the defendant, not an individual agent, the strongly protective 
qualified immunity defenses could not be raised.  The potential 
burden of paying for the individual’s representation and an 
individual damages award would also be eliminated if the 
defendant was the United States.  While there has been discussion 
in Congress of this option in the past, the continued shrinking of 
Bivens may well bring more attention to this option.117  
B. Qualified Immunity Reform
In response to the almost insurmountable difficulties in
successfully challenging the misconduct of state and federal law 
enforcement officials, there have been increasing cries for reform of 
the qualified immunity defense. Because of the outrage 
accompanying the killing of Black Americans by police officers, the 
pressure for change has become increasingly acute.  On the federal 
front, bills have been introduced in Congress that would curtail the 
use of the qualified immunity defense.118  These bills would 
113. The FTCA excludes intentional tort claims, but in 1973, a law
enforcement exception was adopted that allows tort claims based on “assault, 
battery, false imprisonment, [and] false arrest,” thus allowing some claims 
resulting from law enforcement misconduct.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018); see 
also Stern, supra note 110, at 665. 
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (the United States is liable “in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”). 
115. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980).
116. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 110, at 717–20; Fallon, supra note 13, at
980–81. 
117. Taking a contrary view, Professor Reinert argues that the qualified
immunity defense does not have a significant impact on the outcome of federal 
constitutional tort claims.  Reinert, supra note 107, at 817, 843–44. 
118. During the 116th Congress, there were three bills that were introduced
in Congress to reform or abolish qualified immunity: the Ending Qualified 
Immunity Act, the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, and the 
Reforming Qualified Immunity Act.  All three bills would eliminate qualified 
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eliminate the defenses of a good faith belief that the conduct was 
lawful, that the constitutional right was not clearly established, or 
that the defendant could not have reasonably known the conduct 
was unlawful.119  There have also been bills introduced in several 
state legislatures that would reform the qualified immunity 
standard, and in a few states, some reforms have been passed but 
have not yet become law.120  As with the federal bills, these state 
statutes would eliminate the qualified immunity defense while 
providing a state civil remedy for violation of constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The rejection of the Bivens claims brought by the parents of 
Sergio Hernandez Guereca was inevitable.  The Court has steadily 
immunity by amending § 1979 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and 
thus, eliminating the following four defenses: (1) the defendant acted in good 
faith; (2) that the defendant believed that his conduct was lawful; (3) that the 
constitutional right allegedly violate was not “clearly established” at the time 
of the deprivation; and (4) that the defendant could not have been reasonably 
expected to know whether his conduct was lawful due to the state of the law.  
Ending Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. § 4 (2020); Ending 
Qualified Immunity Act, S. 4142, 116th Cong. § 4 (2020); George Floyd Justice 
in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. § 102 (2020); Reforming 
Qualified Immunity Act S. 4036, 116th Cong. § 4 (2020).  However, unlike the 
Ending Qualified Immunity Act and the Justice in Policing Act that merely 
remove those defenses, the Reforming Qualified Immunity Act also creates two 
new defenses to qualified immunity, thus reforming rather than completely 
removing qualified immunity.  See S. 4036 § 4.  
119. See H.R. 7085 § 4; S. 4142 § 4; H.R. 7120 § 102; S. 4036 § 4.  The
Reforming Qualified Immunity Act eliminates the qualified immunity defense 
but creates new defenses if the conduct had previously been found by the courts 
to be constitutional or if the conduct was authorized by state or federal statute.  
See S. 4036 § 4. 
120. There are several states in which qualified immunity reform has either
passed, been considered, is currently being considered, or has concrete plans 
to consider reform in the future.  Both Colorado and Connecticut have enacted 
qualified immunity reform.  Enhance Law Enforcement Integrity Act, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §13-21-131(2)(b) (2020); Act Concerning Police Accountability, 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. P.A. 20-1, § 41 (Westlaw).  Massachusetts has passed 
some form of qualified immunity reform in both chambers, but because both 
chambers’ reforms differed, legislators had to negotiate a new bill.  Steve 
Brown & Ally Jarmanning, Here’s What’s In The Police Reform Law Proposed 
For Massachusetts, WBUR, 
https://www.wbur.org/news/2020/12/01/massachusetts-police-reform-
legislation-explainer [https://perma.cc/A3CY-NKEU] (last updated Dec. 10, 
2020).  However, the version legislators could agree upon did not include 
meaningful qualified immunity reform.  See id.  
92  ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:73 
rejected Bivens claims determining that any factual or legal 
difference creates a new context that requires a presumption 
against the claim.  A wide range of special factors based on a 
hostility to judicially created remedies leads to dismissal of the 
claims.  
As the possibility of successful claims against federal 
misconduct has diminished, the pressure on Congress and state 
legislatures for reform has mounted.  As the Court makes clear that 
it will not provide a remedy against federal misconduct, no matter 
how egregious, reform must come from the legislature.  The 
shocking nature of the shooting in Hernandez and the outrage that 
the defendant suffered no consequences, may well hasten 
legislative response.  
